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 ARGUMENT
 Faux Realism
 Spin versus substance in the Bush foreign-policy doctrine
 By Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik
 he Bush administration has coined a foreign-
 policy doctrine. President George W. Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary
 of State Colin Powell herald "the new realism." Think you know what they are up to? OK, then fill
 in the blank: The "new realism" is . If you find the blank hard to fill, don't worry; so would
 most of today's international-relations scholars. Indeed, one fundamental problem with the Bush
 administration's new doctrine is that "realism" no
 longer has any real intellectual coherence.
 Until recently, realism was a venerable school of
 thought with a distinct thrust. Realpolitikers such
 as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz
 visualized world politics as an anarchic realm in
 which the struggle for survival required prudent
 management of material (generally military)
 resources, and where the balance of power ulti-
 mately determined outcomes. Realists chastised
 "liberals," "legalists," and "idealists," who believe
 that material and military power are secondary to
 factors such as the form of domestic government
 (democratic or authoritarian), the mutual advan-
 tages of economic interdependence, the functional
 benefits of international institutions, and the sway
 of national and transnational beliefs.
 Yet a funny thing happened on the way past the
 Cold War. While still attached to the realist label,
 many realists have abandoned their distinctive
 realpolitik precepts. International-relations scholars
 today are far more inclined to accept that major
 trends-European integration, global trade liber-
 alization, the surprising power of small countries in
 limited wars such as Vietnam, the impact of human
 rights and environmental norms, and the spread of
 a "democratic peace"-are not shaped simply, or
 even primarily, by power. Balance-of-power calcu-
 lations are often trumped by imperatives rising
 from economic globalization, political democrati-
 zation, particular belief systems, and the role of
 international law and institutions.
 Realists have broadened their definition of
 "realism" in an attempt to embrace this smorgas-
 bord of factors. But the consequence has been con-
 ceptual incoherence. Why does the Bush adminis-
 tration associate itself with an academic theory
 that no longer seems to mean anything in particu-
 lar? Aside from the chance that George W. Bush has
 not been keeping up with International Security,
 two broad possibilities stand out:
 One is that "realism" gives good spin. The
 administration employs the term as if its opposite
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 were "idealism," "self-delusion," or, as Rice would
 have it, "romanticism" (as practiced, of course, by
 the previous administration). The implication is
 that realism is primarily about seeing and telling the
 hard truth-a conceit common among realists of the
 1930s and 1940s. Peripatetic pessimist Robert
 Kaplan updates this view of a realist theory that can
 "grapple with how the world actually works" and
 confront the "unrelenting record of uncomfortable
 truths." This tough talk dovetails with Dubya's
 huddle around publications like The Weekly Stan-
 dard and the National Review fearing that the Unit-
 ed States will find itself militarily unprepared for a
 coming battle for global hegemony with great pow-
 ers such as China and a united Europe.
 A second and more thoughtful reason the
 Bush administration may be attracted to the real-
 ist label is that the administration does indeed
 place a greater emphasis on accumulating and
 wielding military power. While the threat percep-
 Any policymaker who relies only on the "realist"
 management of military power reveals a greater faith in
 simplistic theories than do academics themselves.
 own rhetorical style. As the president states, "I'm a
 straightforward person [and]... represent my coun-
 try's interests in a very straightforward way."
 Such realist rhetoric makes for great sound
 bites. (The English theorist Herbert Butterfield
 once remarked that realism was more often a boast
 than a philosophy.) But it signifies little. Realism
 cannot just be a commitment to being "realistic"
 about the world, pursuing the national interest,
 and being willing to say so. What president has not
 claimed that mantle, even if each perceived reality
 with a different emphasis?
 Properly understood, realism offers clearer
 answers: Reality is material power, and the nation-
 al interest is to accumulate and balance that power.
 Yet, as was the case with its immediate predecessor,
 the Bush administration's global threat perception
 has little to do with power balancing. Where in
 W's world are the great powers that could tip the
 global balance: countries like Britain, France, Ger-
 many, Japan, Indonesia, and India? Among great
 powers, the administration singles out only China
 (with finger waving at Russia), throwing it in the
 rogues' clubhouse with North Korea, Iraq, Iran,
 Cuba, Afghanistan, and Libya. These picayune foes
 are targeted not because they are the most power-
 ful-or even minimally powerful-but because they
 are the least democratic and propagate the most hos-
 tile ideologies. This choice of adversaries unites the
 current administration and its predecessor against
 the only remaining pure "realists" in America, who
 tion of the Bush team is based largely on ideolo-
 gy, it remains skeptical of strategy and tactics not
 closely linked to military dominance. The two
 improbable pillars of the administration's poli-
 cy-national missile defense (NMD) and the Pow-
 ell Doctrine-are linked in this way. Other exam-
 ples include the administration's commitment to
 NATO expansion; departure from the long-stand-
 ing policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan; ini-
 tial unwillingness to help broker a solution in the
 Middle East; a stated interest in pulling U.S. troops
 out of the Balkans; the discounting of the foreign
 public relations effects of stridently self-interested
 rhetoric; the slashing of funds to secure Russia's
 loose nukes (and loose nuclear scientists); and the
 president's declaration that Africa "doesn't fit into
 the national strategic interests."
 Most striking, however, is not the Bush admin-
 istration's defense of realist tactics per se, but its
 belief that such tactics foreclose other promising
 means of promoting the national interest, among
 them, democracy promotion, economic integra-
 tion, nonmilitary foreign aid, adherence to human
 rights, or multilateral cooperation. Consider the
 quick quashing of a deal, all but reached by South
 Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, for a far-reach-
 ing d?tente on the Korean peninsula, including
 significant restrictions on the North Korean
 nuclear program. Unfortunately, such a deal,
 designed to spur a positive evolution in North
 Korea's behavior, fit neither the administration's
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 reliance on military deterrence nor its justifi-
 cation for NMD. The administration may
 indeed have adhered to a minimalist notion of
 realism, but at a significant potential cost.
 If the academic debates between "smorgas-
 bord" realists and their critics have one thing to
 teach us, it is that realism's simple solutions to
 policy dilemmas are misguided. The empirical
 research that has undermined academic "real-
 ism" demonstrates that complex, multicausal
 processes underlie most important events. Power
 still matters. But countries do not consistently
 bend to great-power desires, even when backed
 by a credible deterrent; an indirect approach of
 persuasion, negotiation, and, above all, the
 encouragement of positive domestic change, are
 also potent tools of statecraft. Any policymak-
 er who relies only on the "realist" management
 of military power reveals a greater faith in sim-
 plistic theories than do academics themselves.
 So don't be surprised if the "new realism"
 starts to look a bit different this autumn. New-
 born administrations tend to exhibit steep learn-
 ing curves as their staffs fill out, they reach
 bureaucratic compromises, and practical solu-
 tions to complex global realities displace simple
 campaign promises. The Clinton administration
 moved in the opposite direction, pulling back
 from some bold international rhetoric. By the
 end, it pursued (and this is one of the leading crit-
 icisms Rice and others make of their predeces-
 sors) a highly pragmatic policy. If the Bush
 administration remains attuned to global reality,
 it is likely to become more pragmatic as well,
 expanding tactical options beyond decisive and
 unilateral military action. Bush and company
 may continue, of course, to label their hybrid
 doctrine as the "new realism." But outside the
 academy, at least, a misleading label is a small
 price to pay for a sensible foreign policy. IM
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